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1. IKTRODUCTION 
In [l] we have stated a class of multistage games and obtained necessary 
conditions for optimal pure strategies. In the present paper, we will state a 
new class of games named “dual games.” Some of duality theorems will be 
obtained in multistage games. Detailed formulation of multistage games and 
necessary conditions for optimal pure strategies will be found in [l]. 
2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
We will discuss a class of multistage games whose playing space is a bounded 
region V of Euclidean rr + m-space 9. The game is of two-person zero-sum 
with perfect information. Let xk = (xkl, xk2,..., xken) and y, = (ykl, yk2,,.., ykm) 
be the state of player A and B, respectively. K E X = (0, 1,2,..., N). Let Vz 
and WV be bounded region of Euclidean n- and m-space respectively for which 
V is the direct product of them: 
Let ~9~ and 8; be Euclidean r- and s-spaces, respectively. The game is governed 
by the recurrence equations 
xk+l =fkcxk , ukh k EX’ = (0, l,..., N - l} (2-l) 
Ykfl = gk(Yk 9 zk)s kEd’-‘, (2.2) 
where x0 and y0 are given. 
fk:gz x &.',-%Tz and &:g, x gv4’ip, 
are Ct2) mappings. uk E 8.. and zk E & are strategic variables and vector- 
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valued Ciinctions u,,(A!; , y,,.) and J,,(,Y ;, ,y,Z) arc pure strategies of players at 
kth stage. C’onstraints on the choice of 14~ arc 
/\‘,,y.\‘,; I&,) 0, r 1, L..., io, Ji i. if--’ (2.3) 
and on the choice of d,, arc 
S,:J(J,, , z,.) :;: 0, j - 1, 2,. .., (I, k E x1. (2.4) 
\l\ic n-ill assume that R, and SA are of class C’@) on Z, x c.!?~ and F!, x &,, , 
respectively. Define the payoff b> 
S-l 
P(k; 3i’() ,yi) , x, y, (:, q y G.&f y,-) --r c F,&. ,y7;, Ub ) q), (2.5) 
ILO 
where G,’ is the terminal payoff defined on the terminal surface .F(x,v , yN). 
We will denote this game by r(k; xI,. , y&. 
Let a pair of pure stratcgics (ur(xE , yl:): and {a;(s?, , y,,)) be playabic [l] 
and P(k; x,, , y. , X, Y, F, Xx) lx th e \ a ue 1 of the payoff resulting from this 
pair. WC will call these strategies optimal if for some function V(X, 1; I/‘*, Z*) 
W; ~0, yo 9 X, Y, L-, Z”) < V(X, Y, E:“, 2”) :& P(k; x,> , y,, , X, Y, ci*, Z) 
(2.6) 
holds for all possible (xk , y,?) E ‘6. The value J/(X, I’, U*, Z”) is called the 
value of the game T(k; xb , y&. 
In order to avoid complication WC will not distinguish notations of vectors 
from their transpose. Scalar product of vectors will not be denoted any 
symbols. Subscripts rcprcsent the stage number and superscripts are used 
for the components of each variable at cdch stage of the game. The positivity 
of a vector is defined as the positivity of each component. 
DEFINTIOS 1 (Primal Game). The game r(R; xg , y,,.) which we have 
stated above is said to be the primal game. That is, player A wishes to 
maximize the pa> off 1’ by selecting the pure strategies {u,,.(.x,; , y,,.)}, according 
to the recurrence equation (2.1) and constrained 1,~ (2.3). While player B 
wants to minimize the payoff P by choosing the pure strategies {zk(xli , y,<)}, 
according to (2.2) and contrained by (2.4). 
DEFINITION 2 (Dual Game). The game p(‘(k; xk , yK) that has the follow- 
ing properties is said to be dual with respect to the primal. 
Player A wishes to minimize the payoff for the dual game 
p(k; a’ctj , yo , K y, u, z, A, #, vv P) 
X-1 
= P(k; xg , y,, , X, Y, U, Z) -I- c &( fn- .- .~+d -t h&,t - ~a+d 
k=O 
vJ&. -, wJ,J, 
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wher Ak , #,, , vk , and plz are elements of En, Em, IP, and EQ, respectively. 
\Ve 4 note that they are the Lagrangian multiplies in the primal game [l]. 
Constraints of the strategies {24,,(Xk , yk)J are the systems of equalities: 
(2.9) 
with I+ .< 0. Here IilC(Fk , A,; , fk , /Jam , gk) = Fk + Asfk -+ #,;gli . While 
player R wishes to maximize the payoff f by selecting the pure strategies 
{z,~(x,~ , JQJ) constrained by 
kE.X’ (2.10) 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
with pr; :G 0. 
Note that (2.7) to (2.12) are the necessary conditions for optimal strategies 
for two players in the primal game [I]. Therefore, by the dual game we mean 
the game having the necessary conditions for the primal game, as its con- 
straints. 
We have stated a pair of games. In what follows we will state two pairs of 
extremization problems and then will interpret them as the game Ke have 
stated above, To simplify the discussion we will define the following vectors: 
6% = (Xk , %c>, 5 = (X, t’) 
777c = (Yk 9 4, rl =v,q 
A = (+I , A, , A, ,a**, AN-J, A, = (&.I, A,; ,..., A*“), 
9 - cl”, $4 9 $2 9.e.9 #N-l), ‘bk = (#,L1, #k2,..., A’99 
v - (?l , Vl , v2 ,*-*, w-1), v7; = (vgl, Vk2 ,...) lq.q, 
II = (P” 9 PI 9 P2 ,**., PN-I), P7r = (Pkl, h2,..., kc”), kEcx?‘, 
where 
x = (X,,‘, xgt! ,..., x0”, ,%I’, xl2 ,..., xl” ,..., XN’, xN2 ,..., @). 
534 MATSUMOTO AKin SHlMEMURA 
Other vectors have similar meanings. Consequently 8 is an n(N + 1) + YN 
dimensional composite vector. WC will write the recurrence equations (2.1) 
and (2.2) in the following manner: 
Let Tr be a C”) mapping of (n(N j. 1) + rN)-vector E into an nN-vector 
A; that is 7;(t) is an nlS-vector whose components are c’t2) in [. More 
precisely 
T&t) = (fu - Xl ,fi - x2 Y,fN-1 - XN) = 0. 
Let T, be a C(s) mapping of 77 into an mN-vector Q!I, i.e., 
T2(71) = (go - Y1 , g, - Y2 ,--.,&v-l - YN) = 0. 
Furthermore we will rewrite the constraints (2.3) and (2.4) as systems of the 
form 
T,(E) d 0 and T,(7) 2 0, 
where 
Td(E) = (R, , R, I..., RN-~) and T&I) = (&, , s, Y-..s SN-1). 
PRIMAL PROBLEM I. Let (l*, A*, v*) be fixed. Find an 7* that minimizes 
P(t*, 7) constrained by 
Tab11 = 0 and Th) b 0. 
DUAL PROBLEM I. Let ([*, A*, v*) be Jixed. Find an (7*, #*, p*) that 
maximizes the real-valued function 
&f*, 7) = p(t*, 7) + X*T&t*) + +T2(7) + v*Tdt*) + I*T3(7) 
constrained by 
P(t*, 7)11 + h*T,(f*), + $T2(7)a + v*TG*h, + PT3(7)n = Cl 
with p < 0. Here, I’([*, 7)p -; (@/37). 
PRIMAL PROBLEM II. Let (7*, 4*, p*) be$xed. Find a E* that maximizes 
P(s, 7*) subjects to the constraints 
TM = 0 and T.&t) d 0. 
DUAL PROBLEM II, Let (7*, #*, p*) be Fxed. Find an (t*, A*, v*) that 
minimizes the function P(e, 7*, A, Q!J*, v, p*) constrained by 
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3. COWEXITY AND CONCAVITY 
In order to discuss the dual game, we must characterize some of the 
important properties of convex and concave functions. 
DEFINITION 3. Suppose 9? is a convex set of a finite dimensional vector 
space 8. Then a real-valued functionf’(x) defined in 2 is said to be convex 
if for all x and x* in 8, 
f((l - 8) x + ex*) < (1 - @f(x) + ef(x*) 
holds for 0 < 19 :< 1. A real-valued function in 2 is concave if -f(x) is 
convex. 
DEFINITION 4. A vector-valued function in &9 is said to be convex (con- 
cave) if each component is a convex (concave) function. 
LEMMA 1. Iff( ) x is convex and d#erentiable in 28, then 
f(x*> -f(x) >f*(x* - x), 
where fz = (if/a x evaluated at x, for all x and x* in L+?. ) 
If f (x) is concave and d$$rentiable in ~8, the-n 
f(x”) -f(x) <f&* - 4 
for all x and x* in 9. 
PROOF. We will prove only the first relation. From the definition of a 
convex function, for 0 < 8 < 1, 
f (x*) _ f (x) > f(X + e* ; 4) -f(x) . 
Since the relation remains true as B -+ 0 
f(x*) -f(x) 3 9% 
f(x -: qx* - x)) -f(x) 
e 
= fz(x* - x). 
4. A DUAL GAME 
In order to obtain some theorems on dual game we will pose some restric- 
tions. 
(H,) Functions fk and Rk are concave in xk and uk for all k E fl. 
(H,) Functions g, and Sk are convex in yb and zk for all k E X’. 
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(H,,) Function P is concave in both of xk and u6 for each fixed y,; and zk , 
and con\.ex in both of yk and z,< for each fixed .T~ and zllc , for all k E X’. 
I:urthcrmore P is of class C@). 
(H,) The constraint qualification is always satisfied. 
LENVIA 2. Let (H,), (H,) and (HJ hold. If v* minimizes P([*, 7) in the 
primal problem I, then there exist vectors 4” and p* ::l 0, such that (q*, $*, r-l*) 
is the solution of the clual problem I. Conversely, if (q*, #*, p*) maximizes 
IQ*, r,, A”, I/J, I.‘>@ , cc) in the dual problem I and if the matrix of second derivative 
pV:,, evaluated at (T*, $“, p*) has an inverse, then v* minimizes P(t*, T) in the 
primal problem I. IH both cases 
m$ P(S*, 7) = ~$2 &t*, 7, A*, 1L, v*, ~4. I . 
PROOF. 
Pg*, 7)*, x*, i/J*, v*, p*> - fy& 7, A”, $4 v*, EL) (4.1) 
-- P(Lc”, II*) - lye*, 7) -i. h*T,(e*) -- h*Tl(‘z*) + $*T2(7*) - #T,(7) 
+ v*T&?) - v*Tq(f*) + P*T3(7*) - PT3(7) (4.2) 
= w*, 7*) - per, 7) + #*Td7*) - @s(7) + P*u7*) - pTs(7) (4.3) 
= w*, 7*1 - pw, 7) - @s(7) - cLG(7) (4.4) 
2 P,(,lX - 7) - $T,(7) - PTd7) (4.5) 
= p,c,* - 7) + $T,(7”) - #J,(7) + I1Ta(7*) - cLTs(7) - #Ta(7*) 
- /J-3(7”) (4.6) 
3 (P, .I- #T,(7),, - PTs(rl)n) c7* - 7) - 41,Ts(7*) -- Qa(7*) (4.7) 
= - Ws(79 - ELTs(7*) (4.8) 
= - Qs(7*) (4.9 
z 0. 
From (4.4) to (4.9, we have used the convexity property of P in 7 and from 
(4.6) to (4.7) we employed the convexity of the mapping T, and T3 (see 
Lemma 1). From (4.7) to (4.8) we used the constraint (2.13). Note that 
A*?-,(%$*), = 0 and v*T#*)~ = 0. 
Conversely, if (7*, I,I%*, I”*) solves the dual problem I, the Kuhn-Tucker 
optimality conditions must hold for the dual problem I [l, 2): 
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Define the Lagrangian 
where n is an m(N + 1) + ST\’ dimensional vector. Henceforth the condition 
applied to 71 gives 
&Z=o, 
which turns out to be 
= -n*(P,*, + x*T,*(g*),, +$*m77)qn + V*m*)nn + ~*m?M 
(4.10) 
where II* T$(v)~ is the partial derivative of II* 7’s(~) with respect to 7 evaluated 
at T*. Note that pits = 0 [1, 21. S’ mce the left-hand side of (4.10) is 
zero and since we have assumed that p,,,, has an inverse evaluated at (?I*, $*, 
p*), we must conclude that 
Il*=o. 
The condition &$A* = 0 implies 
(4.11) 
P*G(T*) + n*P*m& = 0. 
Hence from (4.10) 
p*T&*) = 0. 
With regard to the well-known theorem in nonlinear programming (see, for 
example, Theorem 3.5 of [3]), the other condition with respect to p yields 
for some m(N + 1) + sN dimensional vector j3 > 0. But since II* = 0, 
we see that 
T&l*) 2 0. 
It is easy to see that T,(v*) = 0. Th is shows that T* is in the feasible region 
of the primal problem I. Finally, CL* < 0 is the hypothesis (2.13). Thus all 
the conditions for the primal problem I hold. Q.E.D. 
We have shown that 
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LENMA 3. Let the assumptions (H,), (H.J and (II,) hold. If E* maximizes 
P([, rl*) in the primal problem II, there exist rectors A* and v* 5; 0, such that 
(t*, A*, v*) is the solution ?f the dual problem II. Conversely, if (t*, A*, v*) 
minimizes B(f, qX, A, s+!J”, V, p*) in the dual problem II and if the matrix of 
second derir;atiz;e P,, eoaluated at (ET, h *, v”) has an incerse, then t* maximizes 
P( E, 7 *) in the primal problem II. $Ioreocer in both cases 
my P(t, q*) 7 $11 P(t, rl*, A, 1cI*, v, P*). I .a, 
PROOF. From the concavity of the function P in 5 and that of TI and T4 , 
@*, vx, A”, +*, v*, py - p’(t, rl*, 4 **, v, I”*) 
= I’((*, rl*) - P(t, 7”) - hT,(O - VT&) 
::, P&f* - t) - AT,(t) - VT&~) 
< (PC + hT,(5), + VT&%) (E* - 0 - C&T*) - vTdS*) 
= - VT&*) 
< 0. 
Thus 
and hence 
qt*, ?1*, A*, #“, v*, PL*) = qt*, ‘I*) 
mgax P(5, rl*) = ;Ihin P(t, rl*, A, **, v, P*). . .” 
Converse is easy to prove. Q.E.D. 
Now from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we can show that in the primal game 
w; xl6 9 Yk), 
P(X, y*, li, z*) 6 lqx*, y*, 1r*, z*> 2: P(x*, Y, u*, Z) 
holds and in the dual game f(k; xk , yA) 
PP(x*, Y, 17*, z, A*, *, v*, p) :: qx*, y*, u*, z*, A*, **, v*, p.I*) 
< P(X, I~*, u, z*, A, +*, V) p*) 
holds. Thus we have proved the following two theorems: 
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THEORE~I 1. Let (H,) to (H4) hold. If playable strategies {u,$(xk , yJ} 
and C%% , rd are optimal pure strategies for the primal game T(k; xIC , yJ 
which has a unique value V(X*, Y*, U*, Z*), then @(xL , yJ} and {zz(xli , yk)} 
are optimal pure strategies also for the dual game I’(k; xh- , yl,), having its value 
v(X*, I’*, lJ;*, Z*, Xx, #“, v*, p*). Furthermore 
V(XT, Y*, c-*, z*> = qx*, Y”, c*, z*, I\*, **, v*, p*). 
THEOREM 2. Let all the assumptions of Theorem I hold. Let the matrices of 
second derivative pet and p,,, evaluated at (E*, A*, v*) and (y*, $*, TV*) respect- 
ively have their inverse. If playabk strategies {u:(xB , yk)} and {zz(xk: , yk)} are 
optimal for the dual game r(k; X~ , yk) which has a unique value 
qx*, y*, u*, z*, A*, **, v*, p* ), then they are optimal pure strategies also 
for the primal game r(k; xk , yJ having its value V(X*, Y*, U*, Z*). More- 
over 
lqx*, y*, u*, z*, A*, l/G”, v*, p*) = v’(x*, y*, u*, z*>. 
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